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Abstract 
Fiqh, indicating Islamic law and the tools to produce it, covers all aspects of human 
dealings, including ones with the Creator, as embodied in Fiqh of devotions, and ones 
between human beings themselves as embodied in other branches of Islamic law like 
personal status law, political law, criminal law and financial law. Islamic financial law 
includes the Shariah nominated contracts that represent the bases for all Islamic 
banking and finance transactions including those that have been developed and 
modeled after the existing ones. However, developing or endorsing a financial 
product is a process that requires the Faqih (Shariah scholar) to employ and consult a 
variety of Fiqh instruments. These instruments are also prescribed and detailed in 
Islamic law; however, many Shariah specialists and observers have protested 
improper use of these instruments. The paper comes to first discuss the most 
important proper Fiqh instruments available to the Faqih to evaluate and endorse 
products and transactions in Islamic finance. It then elaborates on the instruments 
whose use in the domain of modern Islamic finance has allegedly reflected a 
departure from Shariah rules and tools of Ijtihad. The objective of this paper is to 
shed some light on the cotemporary Ijtihad in Fiqh of Finance in light of the 
guidelines provided by the Shariah in an attempt to draw the outlines of what 
constitutes a proper role of Ijtihad Fiqhi in Islamic finance. 
 
 
Introduction 
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Islamic law is the most flexible heavenly revealed law when compared with the other 
revealed laws in their original versions as the Quran tells us. Thanks to this flexibility, Islamic 
law or Fiqh can accommodate many market needs. Elements of flexibility of Islamic financial 
law include: Permissibility being the original rule in Shariah, Shariah rules not being all fixed 
or permanent for they include the Mutaghiyyrat (changeable), and prohibition not being of 
the same degree in Shariah. Equipped with a flexible basis for legislation, the Faqih is 
provided with general guidelines that help him reach sound and acceptable rulings. These 
guidelines teach the Faqih to observe while judging or developing a transaction: the 
structure of the transaction, the essence of the transaction, the general as well as the 
particular Shariah objectives of the transaction and the implication of implementing the 
transaction. Shariah also teaches the Faqih to prioritize these requirements when 
compromising some is necessary. Well-established Shariah concepts, however, like Shariah 
policy, public interest and necessity have been used in the modern Fiqh, especially in Islamic 
finance, to reprioritize these requirements and sacrifice some. Although these concepts are 
Shariah concepts and some are originally valid instruments in Ijtihad Fiqhi, applying them in 
the context of Islamic finance has raised major Shariah concerns. The following discussion 
touches on some of the proper fiqh instruments for Islamic finance, and then it elaborates 
on the instruments effectively in use and their Shariah concerns.    
 
The Proper Fiqh instruments in Islamic Finance 
Shariah equips Shariah scholars conducting Ijtihad with multiple fiqh instruments that help 
them create and endorse products. The following are the most important fiqh instruments 
available to the Mujtahid.1 
 
1. Shariah texts and their interpretations 
                                                          
1 Mujtahid is the one who performs Ijtihad Fiqhi. 
3 
 
Shariah texts refer to Quran and Sunnah. In the area of financial transactions Shariah texts 
provide general rules and rarely provide details. This is because the nature of financial 
transactions changes over time (Mutaghiyyrat) and tends to get more complicated with the 
advance of age. Therefore, it will not be convenient to provide details on something 
changeable by nature, because these details will not be relevant to the modern applications 
of the contracts. The general rules provided by the Shariah texts, however, are sufficient for 
Muslim jurists to deduce Shariah rules for the modern transactions, because these general 
rules represent, in fact, principles on the basis of which right Shariah rules for the new 
financial transactions can be derived. When attempting Ijtihad, however, Muslim jurists 
may find that the same Shariah text pertaining to a financial transaction may be interpreted 
in multiple valid ways. In fact, this applies to most legal Shariah texts and explains the 
reasons why within the boundaries of Shariah existed different schools of Fiqh. 
Contemporary Shariah scholars do not need to restrict their fatawa (legal opinions) to one 
particular valid interpretation, or even to the interpretations made by the classic schools of 
Fiqh, as long as the interpretation they may opt for, or develop on their own, is basically 
valid, i.e. it is not in conflict with the established Shariah rules and principles, and the Arabic 
language can accommodate it within the context of the text. 
 
2. Permissibility being the original ruling in Shariah 
In the absences of a clear and authoritative text, things are deemed by Shariah to be halal 
(permissible). The prohibition, on the other hand, needs to be communicated to Muslims in 
definitive terms in order to be established over something. This, in fact, constitutes a vital 
tool in the hands of the Shariah scholars to endorse new Islamic banking and finance 
products and transactions. Any new structured products or transaction can be endorsed by 
Shariah boards as long as it is free from the prohibited elements like Riba (interest), Gharar 
(uncertainty) or Ghabn (fraud).  
 
3. Prohibition being of different categories 
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Prohibition in the Shariah is not of the same category especially in the field of financial 
transactions, for there exist the so-called haram lithatihi (unlawful in itself) and haram 
lighairihi (unlawful in consideration of something else). The first prohibition is applicable to 
cases where the evil is embedded in the very act, like in Riba where charging interest is an 
evil in itself, or in gambling where it involves unjustified seizure of others’ properties. The 
second prohibition relates to acts that are originally lawful but made unlawful owing to the 
presence of certain conditions, like sale contract when concluded during Jum'a (Friday) 
prayer. 2 Although sale contract is originally halal by virtue of some textual evidences, it is 
deemed haram if concluded during Jum’a prayer since engaging in the act of sale, or any 
other transaction, may lead to the evil of missing Jum’a prayer. In other words, the haram 
lighairihi is unlawful in view of its results and implications.3 Being so, there is an avenue for 
acts under this category of prohibition not to be regarded unlawful if they can be construed 
as non leading to the perceived cautions. This means that if care is exercised for the act not 
to be conducive to the feared evil, then the act may be regarded as lawful. This, in fact, adds 
to the flexibility to Islamic law and functions as a relaxing instrument particularly within the 
framework of Islamic financial contracts.  
However, it remains the responsibility of Shariah scholars to identity the unlawful acts that 
can fall under this category of prohibition, in order to look into the possibility of neutralizing 
them by laying the appropriate conditions that will deprive these acts of their evil-producing 
nature. In this regard, it can be said that the very prohibition of gharar (uncertainty), one of 
the main reasons for deeming many financial transaction unlawful, is declared by some 
esteemed old Shariah scholars not to be meant for itself, but in conjunction with its possible 
evil implications (tahreem tharai’i) like the dispute it may lead to between the parties to the 
                                                          
2  Kamali, "Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence" p.330 
3  For more details on this matter see Abozaid, Abdulazeem. (2007). “Examining the Malaysian Shariah 
Guidelines for Islamic REITs”, a paper presented at the International Conference on Islamic Capital 
Market, which was organized by Muamalat Institute & Islamic Research and Training Institute in Jakarta, 
August 27-29. 
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contract.4 This means that gharar is prohibited only when evils are expected; if, however, 
none of the evils or harms recognized by the Shariah is to be anticipated, then the contracts 
involving the gharar can be validated. This stand may be supported by the existence of 
many exceptions Shariah make to gharar prohibition, like in the Shariah validation of 
gharar-bearing contracts like Salam and Istisna’5,  and also in tolerating gharar in contracts 
when it is minor and trivial in size. 
 
4. Analogy (Qiyas) 
Analogy is very instrumental in Ijtihad Fiqhi, it relates to the extension of a Shariah ruling of 
an old established case to a new case when the latter shares the same illah (effective cause) 
of the former. Since Shariah texts have stated the rulings of many financial transactions, the 
Faqih may make use of these stated rulings by extending the same to the new transactions 
if they are found to be sharing the same illah. For example, the modern day financial 
derivatives, when used for hedging, have been basically found to be similar in essence to 
gambling and games of luck, and therefore they have been ruled by contemporary scholar 
as unlawful, since gambling itself is stated by Shariah texts as unlawful. Thus, qiyas is a very 
vital and useful instrument, and it ensures consistency between Shariah and reason. The 
challenge however is, to certain extend, in identifying the illah and to larger extend in 
assessing the similarity of the new case with the old case; a process that jurists have termed 
as tahqiq al-manat. 
 
5. Public interests (al-Maslaha al-Mursalah) 
                                                          
4 Ibn Tayimiyah and Ibn Al-Qaiyyem have adopted this approach. Further details and discussion can be 
found in Al-Dareer, Al-Gharar wa Atharauhu fil Uqud, a book published in Arabic by Dar al-Jeel, 2009, 
second edition.  
5 Other examples include Khayar al-Shart (option of stipulation), and the sale of pregnant animals. In the 
first case, the contract is uncertain to the contractor who grants this option to the other, and in the 
second case a part of the price goes implicitly to the pregnancy thought its outcome is not certain. 
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By definition, Maslaha Mursalah refers to any interest that is deemed to be beneficial to 
the society and which has no textual evidence on its authority or otherwise. It is a juristic 
device whose authority has been established based on the fact that all Shariah rules are 
meant to realize public benefits. Muslim jurists have built on this fact the notion of 
Maslaha; deeming as permissible anything that realizes public interest, and as invalid or 
impermissible anything that brings about harm and evil. One of the basic conditions, 
however, for the operation of this juristic instrument is for the perceived Maslaha not to be 
in conflict with any Shariah text or established principles, for human perception of Maslaha 
may err, and Shariah texts and principles must prevail over any human legal exercise.6 
Among the major fiqh schools, Maliki school is known to be the leading proponent of 
maslaha as one of the Ijtihad instruments and sources of Shariah.  On the other hand, other 
Fiqh schools reject it as independent source of Shariah though they practice it, possibly 
under different name7, without theoretically admitting its authority as an independent 
source of the Shariah. 8 
 
Relationship between maslaha & maqasid al-Shariah (Shariah objectives) 
Maslaha directly relates to Maqasid al-Shariah since the very realization of maslaha is the 
primary objective of the Shariah. Protection of religion, life, lineage, intellect and wealth are 
the five essential values of Shariah, and all Shariah rules revert to these values. Rules of 
                                                          
6 The formulation of a rule on the basis of  ‘al-maslaha al-mursalah’ must take into account the public 
interest and conform to the objectives of Shariah. The application of this tool must fulfill three main 
conditions. First, it only deals with transaction matters (muamalah) where reasoning through rational 
faculty is deemed to be plausible. Second, the interests should be in harmony with the spirit of Shariah. 
In other words it must not be in conflict with any of its main sources.  Third, the interests should be of 
essential and necessary (darurah) and not of a luxury type. For more details, see Abozaid. Abdulazeem, 
“The Devotional Dimension in Interest-oriented Shariah Rulings” Article in Arabic, Journal of Islam in Asia, 
Volume 3, No 1, July 2006;  Sobhi R. Mahmassani, The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Kuala 
Lumpur: Open Press, 2000). 87-89. 
7 Istihsan, for example, which is adopted by the Hanafi school, leads in some of its applications to the 
same end result of Maslaha; it endorses Shariah rules based on their inherent benefits. 
8 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shariah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
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Ibadah and Jihad, for example, relate to the protection of religion. Islamic rules of financial 
transactions, on the other hand, relate to the protection of wealth.  Protection of all these 
essential values is the ultimate maslaha for human beings and thus, it is the primary Shariah 
objective. 
 
6. Blocking the means to evil 
Among the valid juristic devices that the Mujtahid needs to uphold while attempting Ijtihad 
on a Shariah issue is Sad al-tharaiy’, which means blocking the means to evil before it 
materializes. A particular transaction could be lawful in itself but in view of its goal or 
outcome it may lead to evil and thus, it should be ruled as unlawful. Leasing a real estate 
property, for example, to a company that will use it as a gambling casino is unlawful though 
the lease contract in essence is lawful; this is in view of the implication of this lease 
contract, which is in this context facilitating the evil of gambling. Another application is sale 
contract when executed in a way that renders it an interest-bearing loan. Selling an asset on 
credit basis then buying it instantly on the spot for a cash price and in collusion with the 
buyer is effectively a Riba contract, whereby the original seller has advanced cash money to 
the buyer then claimed from him more, and the asset of sale has been used only as a tool to 
presumably legalize the exchange of cash (inah sale).  
In fact, Sad al-tharaiy’ is of a special importance in Islamic finance since it protects it from 
the invasion of products that have a valid structure but an unlawful essence. It, in other 
words, helps ensure the identity of Islamic finance being genuinely distinguished from that 
of conventional finance. 
Thus, Sad al-tharaiy’ is a juristic device that excludes rather than endorses new products, 
but yet it is extremely vital tool to ensure the quality of the products being genuinely 
Shariah complaint and not conducive to the evils of the conventional banking and finance 
products.  
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Invalid Fiqh Instruments & Applications  
Despite the valid instruments the Shariah equips the Mujtahid with when determining 
Shariah validity of contracts and transactions as detailed above,  the contemporary Ijtihad 
in Islamic finance has departed from the proper tools and methodology of Ijtihad Fiqhi by 
adopting inapplicable instruments, twisting or misusing of some instruments and 
overlooking important instruments as detailed in the following discussion.  
 
I. Use of inapplicable instruments 
 
1. Shariah Policy (al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah) 
The term Shariah policy has recently entered the jargon of the fatawa related to Islamic 
banking and finance. Some products and transactions have in their list of fatwa 
justifications the term Shariah policy. So what is Shariah policy and is it a valid instrument in 
the hand of Shariah boards to endorse products and transactions on its basis? 
 
a. Meaning of Shariah Policy 
Shariah policy, or al-siyasah al-Shar’iyyah, in its broad sense refers to the area in Islamic 
Fiqh that explains rulings related to policies and approaches taken in managing and 
organizing national policies in accordance with the spirit of the Shariah. It covers a whole 
spectrum of issues in areas like economics, the judiciary, politics and international 
relations.9 It is the management of the public and general affairs of the Muslim state in 
accordance with the public interests and the interest of the Muslim state. 
Shariah policy involves different principles including striking the balance between what it is 
dictated by the circumstances and the stated Shariah rules. In other words, it gives the 
                                                          
9 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shariah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
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Muslim governor the needed flexibility to occasionally set aside an established Shariah rule 
in favor of a new rule that has Shariah bearing if the latter serves the public interest or the 
state in a better way. It may involve the temporary suspension of some Shariah provisions 
that relate to Mubahat (the permissible). In other words, it relates to Maslaha in its macro 
applications, and in some of its application it relates to the estimation of the general 
darurah (necessity) that is capable of rendering the prohibited things permissible or the 
obligatory things not mandatory. Examples for Shariah policy includes launching of war, 
signing of treaties, disallowing marriage before a certain age, enforcing mandatory 
education and enacting new laws. 
 
b. Who is to determine the Shariah policy? 
Shariah policy can only be determined by the Muslim government and cannot be left to be 
determined by individuals, including Shariah scholars. This is because it relates to the 
management of the people and the state general affairs, which is the responsibility of the 
Muslim government.  Assuming the responsibilities of the Muslim government by 
individuals opens the door to an endless evil. Basically, individuals do not have the 
capabilities to draw general policies, and even if they come to process them, it is feared that 
they may tilt the scale in their own favor and use this principle to serve their own private 
interests.  
 
c. Mishandling of Shariah policy in Islamic finance 
Shariah scholars assuming the Muslim government’s responsibilities in determining Shariah 
Policies in Islamic finance. 
In the absence of Shariah-committed Muslim governments and their roles in drawing up the 
necessary Shariah policies in Islamic finance to meet the challenges facing this industry, 
individual Shariah boards and scholars have without authorization taken up this 
responsibility of the Muslim government and engaged themselves in practicing the Shariah 
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policy. However, the danger stems from the fact that realization of the public’s interests 
and maintenance of Shariah objectives, which are the core of Shariah policy, will have been 
then placed at risk. This is because Shariah policy is a quite sensitive principle. When 
Shariah scholars play Shariah policy, their presumed transparency may be challenged and 
be influenced by the material gains they may derive from the Shariah rules they determine 
on the basis of their exercise of the Shariah policy. Obviously, Shariah scholars are not 
neutral or independent in this regard, but rather beneficiaries from the rules they may 
justify on Shariah policy basis. In other words, it is justifiably feared that this very sensitive 
legal tool called Shariah policy may be misused by the Shariah boards to tolerate unlawful 
transactions that would please their employers (Islamic banks) under the pretext and the 
claim that these transactions serve the public interest or the economies of the Muslim 
countries. Besides, competitions between banks and  lack of coordination among Shariah 
boards will very likely result in having conflicting estimation of the Shariah policy, yielding 
thus conflicting rules, products and stands on what constitutes a public interest. Eventually, 
it is the Ummah in general that will suffer from this practice and the Shariah policy will lead 
to what’s just the opposite goal of what it has been designed for.  
It is for these two reasons that the Islamic Shariah gives the power of determining Shariah 
policy to the Muslim government and not to individual bodies or entities. In fact, it is a tool 
in the hand of the official politicians, as the name indicates, and not in the hands of anyone 
else, so the absence of Shariah-observant Muslim government does not give the right to 
individuals to assume responsibilities which cannot be theirs. 
Moreover, determining an issue on the basis of Shariah policy is not simple; it is a process 
that involves observing different considerations such as the degree of urgency, measuring 
the harms against the benefits expected and the implications on all levels. It may also 
involve setting a timeframe that needs to be observed and possibly amended in the light of 
the results, implications and the changing circumstances. Therefore, it is not a simple 
process but rather one that requires an institution at the top government level. For this 
reason determining a Shariah policy is a joint governmental work. The Muslim ruler should 
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set Shariah policies after consultation with the Shura (consultation) council which houses 
trustful and independent consultants of different specialties and backgrounds.  
Another important element that relates to the operation of Shariah policy is the 
enforcement of the policy, for the absence of the enforcement power may lead to opposite 
results. In the context of Islamic banking and finance, if not all of the financial institutions 
abide by the rules issued on Shariah policy basis, disorder and chaos will prevail, and these 
institutions will fail to play their perceived economic role in the society. Thus, even when 
the Shariah policy is played right by individuals, lack of enforcement will hinder its success 
and may turn it ineffective.  
However, none of the above is observed when Shariah policy is determined by individual 
Shariah scholars or Shariah boards, and apart from that, lesson of experience have taught 
us that transparency is not something that can be taken for granted in any person, and 
Shariah scholars being humans and fallible are never an exception. In fact, Shariah dictates 
that transparency and credibility must be sought in anyone who is to hold an office 
attending to public affairs and needs, but being a practical and realistic religion, Shariah 
does not stop at this point. It, in fact, places rules and restrictions on the conduct and the 
behavior of such a person. The Muslim judge for example must be among the most 
trustworthy persons to be eligible for his position, but his proven trustworthiness never 
gives him the right to take fees or accept gifts from the parties attending his court, for this 
may trigger his instinctively sinful human nature and thus influence his judgment and cause 
him to deviate from the path of justice.10 
 
2. The Principle of Darurah (Necessity)  
It is a well established principle in Islamic law that Darurah, which means necessity, renders 
the prohibited things permissible. This principle is unanimously agreed upon by all schools 
                                                          
10 All Fiqh schools are of the opinion that Judges cannot be paid or gifted by the parties attending their courts, and 
according to some Fiqh schools they cannot even accept gifts from the public. See Ibn Qudama, Al-Mughni, volume 
10, page 118, case 8267. (published by Dar Ihia’ Turath Arabi, 1985).   
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of Islamic law, and it constitutes a Fiqh maxim that reads “Necessities permits the 
forbidden” (Al-Dharurat Tubih Al-Mahzurat). It means that the forbidden can be un-sinfully 
committed when necessary. However, when jurists discussed and explained the 
applications of this fiqh maxim they mentioned what is known in Arabic as dawabit, which 
means conditions and guidelines, for the functionality of this maxim. These guidelines 
(dawabit) are of course stated in or derived from the Shariah texts. One of the guidelines 
relates to what constitutes a darurah. The jurists’ approach to the concept of legal darurah 
can be summarized by saying that darurah is something which is indispensable for the 
preservation and protection of the five essential values: Religion, Life, Intellect, lineage and 
Wealth.11 This means that being in the state of darurah gives the Mukallaf  (the Muslim 
charged with Shariah rules) the legal excuse to commit the forbidden when it becomes 
indispensable for his survival, spiritually or physically. 12 
Therefore, in order for the principle of darurah to be operative, the underlying act must be 
indispensable for the survival of the human being, i.e. it must be a necessity. However, 
some Fiqh schools have placed at par with necessity what is termed in the Shariah as Hajah 
(need) but only when it is public. This term refers to a human need that is not essential for 
the survival of human beings, but it is important for their well being. In other words, hajah 
is what a human can survive without which but only with hardship and difficulties. For 
example, having a car is not a necessity in Shariah terms, but it may be a public need in 
some places. 
 
Misapplication of Darurah 
Darurah has been loosely used in Islamic banking and finance to justify products that would 
not pass Shariah scrutiny test and would breach basic Shariah rules. The justifying argument 
                                                          
11 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/10. 
12 Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-‘adliyyah, section 22; Ibn Nujaim, Zainulddin, Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, 1/105-107; 
Al-Seyoti, Jalaulddin, (911 H).  Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, p.84-92; Al-Kurdi, Ahmad.  Al-Madkhil Al-Fiqhi, 
p.48. 
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predicates on the submission that such products are indispensable for the survival and long-
term sustainability of Islamic bank due to certain uncontrollable considerations. Very 
clearly, this argument presumes that the very concept of banking is a necessity in itself, 
while in the actual fact banking is not indispensable for the Mukallaf’s survival from the 
Shariah perspective, nor is it a public need in Shariah terms. If such darurah hypothetically 
exists, then it would rather legitimize dealing with conventional banks directly. 
Obviously, when Shariah prohibits something it always provides alternatives. For example 
when Shariah prohibits zina it permits marriage, when it prohibits wine and pork for 
consumption it permits all other sorts of food and drinks. Likewise, when Shariah prohibits 
certain contracts such as contracts based on riba (interest) and gharar (uncertainty), it 
alternatively permits many contracts like sale, lease, salam, istisna’, mudarabah and 
musharakah. To economists, such contracts are even better alternatives to riba and gharar, 
and ultimately can help develop a prosperous and a healthy economy, while an economy 
that is based on riba and gharar deepens the disparity between the rich and the poor, and 
leads to inequitable and unjust wealth allocation in a given society. Thus, there is no 
darurah that may allow Islamic banks to abandon these beneficial contracts in favour of 
harmful and destructive ones. 
Moreover, tolerating a sinful activity on the basis of darurah never justifies the claim of its 
original permissibility. Islamic banks have tolerated certain products on the basis of darurah 
then offered the same to the public as Shariah compliant products. Obviously, this is a 
betrayal of Shariah rules and betrayal of the clients’ trust, not to mention the negative 
effects of such attitude on the image of Shariah, if not Islam in general. Promoting as 
Shariah compliant something which is not raises questions marks on the rationality of the 
religion by Muslim and non-Muslims alike, which may cause aversion to Islam.  
 
II. Misuse of valid instruments 
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1. Misuse of Maslaha 
Maslaha as a fiqh instrument has been overemphasized by contemporary Ijtihad in Islamic 
banking and finance. In some cases it has been treated as a priority over Shariah texts as 
well as Shariah established rules. Upon the existence of a conflict between a Shariah text or 
an established rule and a Mujtahid’s perception of Maslaha, the latter has been sometimes 
given a priority over the established Shariah text or rule, like in circumventing the 
prohibition of Riba, though its prohibition is clearly established, on the basis of Maslaha. 
This work is a departure from the legal Maslaha, i.e. the Maslaha that carries a legislative 
power in Islamic law, for a variety of reasons: 
First, the claim of a possible conflict between Shariah text and maslaha is an erroneous 
claim. If the Shariah text or rule is definitive, then it cannot be in conflict with a real 
maslaha, because all Shariah rules aim at realization of maslaha. Therefore, in this case it is 
the assessment of maslaha by the Mujtahid which will be deemed erroneous.  In other 
words, the issue of a potential conflict existing between a definitive Shariah text and the 
maslaha is not conceivable if we are viewing maslaha from a Shariah perspective. However, 
if we are viewing maslaha from a human perspective then the conflict is plausible, but the 
determination of what is beneficial and what is harmful cannot be left to human reasoning 
alone13. Human reasoning plays a role only in a framework guided by Shariah. This is 
because, the inherent limitations of human beings posit a strong reason which requires 
Divine guidance to ascertain what is right and what is wrong. 14  
   Second, even if such a conflict hypothetically exists, then it is the Shariah texts that must 
be given priority over maslaha. This is particularly true since maslaha derives its authority 
from the Shariah text and not vice versa. It is illogical to give priority to a branch over its 
parent and source of authority.15  
                                                          
13 This argument is supported by a number of Qur’ānic verses. One of which is Qur’ān 23:71. Refer to Al-
‘iz bin Abdelsalam, Qua’id Al-Ahkam fi Masalih Al-Anam, 2/161.  
14 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shariah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
15 Al-Zuhaili Wahbah, Al-Waseet fi Usul al-Fiqh, p. 361. 
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   Third, the approach of giving priority to maslaha fails to distinguish between a definitive 
(qat`y) and a speculative (zanniy) text. If the text is definitive with regards to its authenticity 
(thubut) and meaning (dilalah), then the ruling it produces is final and binding; i.e. there is 
no room for human’s perception of maslaha to add any interpretation to the text.While if 16 
the text is speculative with regards to its authenticity or meaning, then there may be an 
avenue for the perceived maslaha to further interpret and give meaning to the text in a way 
that does not hinder its realization. This is acceptable as long as the perceived maslaha 
meets all of its conditions: being public not private, authentic not false, definitive not 
probable.17 
 
To summarize, upon presuming an occurrence of a genuine conflict between the Shariah 
text  and the maslaha, then priority must be given to the Shariah text and not the perceived 
maslaha, this is provided the Shariah text is definitive it terms of authenticity and meaning. 
If, however, there is a justifiable doubt over the authenticity or the meaning of the text, 
then there is an avenue for the perceived maslaha to reconcile with the text. 
 
2. Twisted interpretations of  Shariah texts & Fiqh statements 
 Some Interpretations of Shariah texts that came in the form of fiqh statements made by 
some fiqh schools have been twisted to help legitimize certain problematic Islamic banking 
and Finance products. For example, although sale of future debt to a third party is ruled as 
unlawful by all fiqh schools based on some Shariah texts, its validity has been falsely and 
mistakenly attributed to some fiqh schools (like the Shafi’i school), and a groundless 
distinction has been made between a debt resulting from a loan contract and a debt 
resulting from other financial contracts; allowing selling the later but not the former. In fact, 
neither the validity of sale of debt nor this distinction has any Shariah bearing whatsoever, 
                                                          
16 See in Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfah, p176; Al-Bouti, Dhawabit Al-Maslah, p119. 
17 Al-Bouti, Dawabit Al-Maslah, p.119. 
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and this position is based on twisted interpretation of Shariah texts and some fiqh 
statement. 18 
Another example is Inah sale, although all fiqh schools base the permissibility of the 
contract on its essence and objective, rather than its form and structure, which is the basis 
for the validity of the contract, cotemporary fatawa in Islamic finance have implied the 
opposite; considering a contract Shariah compliant only if its from and structure are sound 
from Shariah perspective. Not only do these fatawa contravene Shariah texts and principles 
by basing contracts permissibility on their form and structure rather than essence and 
objective, but some of them attribute also such erroneous stand to the Shafi’i Fiqh School 
when they claim that this school rules the permissibility19 of inah sale. 20 
 
III. Overlooking important instruments 
1. Relevant Shariah texts  
Some Shariah texts have been overlooked in fatawa on Islamic banking and finance 
products although they are closely related to the fatawa in questions. For example, Shariah 
texts very clearly state that combining between sale contracts and loan contract in one 
transaction is unlawful (It is prohibited to combine between sale and  21"عيبو فلس لحي لا"
loan), and like sale contract in this regard is any commutative contracts as elaborated by 
jurists.22 This is because the sale or the commutative contract in general can be used to 
                                                          
18 For details on this issue refer Abozaid, Abdulazeem. “Examining the New Applications of Sale of Debt in 
the Islamic Financial Institutions", Journal of Islam in Asia, Volume 5, No 2, December 2008.  It can be 
downloaded from www.abdulazeem-abozaid.com  
19 For details on these sales see Abozaid Abdulazeem “Contemporary Inah is it a sale or usury” a book 
published in Arabic by Dar Al-Multaqa, Aleppo, Syria, 2004; Abozaid Abdulazeem. “Contemporary Islamic 
Financing Modes between Contracts Technicalities and Shariah Objectives”, Eighth Harvard University 
Forum on Islamic Finance, Harvard Law School – Austin Hall, USA, April 19-20, (2008). 
20 Abozaid, Abdulazeem. "Examining Bay' al-'inah and its New Applications in the Islamic Financial 
Institutions", Journal of Al-Tamaddun, Volume 4, December 2008.  
http://umrefjournal.um.edu.my/public/article-view.php?id=2318 
21 This Hadith is reported in many Sunnah authoritative books including: Sunan AbiDaud, (3504) and Sunan Al-
Termithi, (1234). 
22 Al-Dasuqi. Hashiyah, 3/76. 
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cater to interest in the loan contract. For example, interest can be catered to in sale 
contract by demanding a price that is higher or lower than the market value, like in the 
lender colluding with the borrower to give him an interest-free loan but conditional on the 
latter buying from the former something at higher than the market value, or selling him 
something at lower than the market value. 
 However, this Shariah text has been totally overlooked in a variety of products, like in a 
product termed “Islamic Pawn Broking”. Herein the bank provides a so-called interest-free 
loan but conditional on the borrower providing valuables that will be ‘safeguarded’ by the 
bank against fees, so that the bank can profit from the loan indirectly through the fees 
charged on the so- called safekeeping of the valuables. Another product is the service-based 
Islamic Credit Cards, the issuing bank provides the card credit on interest-free loan basis; 
however, it charges the card holder for the embedded services as well as the extra services 
coupled with the card, like the free stuff the card holder may be entitled to when 
subscribing to the cards.  This practice is basically valid, but provided the fees are against 
the services and not the loan. To ensure it is so, the market value of these embedded or 
attached services must not be lower than the fees charged on the card. However, in 
practice it is much lower, which means that the fees are meant to cater to the interest over 
the loan. 
 
2. Blocking the means to evil 
Although this instrument is vital and important for identifying the Shariah compliant 
products and protecting contracts from being misused and manipulated as elaborated 
earlier, it has not received the due attention by Shariah scholars working for Islamic banks. 
This is evidenced by the existence of products criticized for being genuinely no different 
from the conventional products, and by the misapplication of some Islamic finance products 
to the degree of distortion. Had this instrument been observed and applied, it would have 
removed these practices from the shelves of Islamic banks and filtered financing deals so 
that no financing will be given when resulting in unfavorable implications  
18 
 
 
Conclusion 
From the past discussion it can be concluded that Shariah has equipped Muslim jurists and 
scholars with useful and practical fiqh instruments that if used properly will yield sound and 
controversy-free transactions and products.  However, due to improper implementation of 
these instruments, some controversial products have crept into Islamic finance and ruined 
the image of the industry. The main reason behind this unfortunate phenomenon is the 
disorder and the lack of organization in the Ijtihad domain despite its tremendous 
importance and the adverse impacts of not giving it the due attention. To reform the status 
quo of Ijtihad in the filed of Islamic banking and finance, the following urgent steps are 
necessitated. 
- Ijtihad in Islamic finance must be exercised by Ijtihad institution and not by 
individuals at least on the products level, whereby a truly independent centralized 
Shariah committee has the authority to endorse or reject products. 
- The independent central Shariah committee must include besides highly qualified 
Shariah scholars economists, lawyers and financial experts, and it must have a 
binding authority over the individual Shariah boards. 
- In the absence of the Shariah-committed Muslim government, a body comprising 
highly qualified intellectuals of different relevant specialties, similar to Shura council, 
can be formed to handle matters related to Shariah policy, and it can collaborate 
with the central Shariah committee to determine the Shariah policy related to 
Islamic finance. 
- All fatawa issued by individual Shariah boards or scholars must be subjected to 
scrutiny by the centralized Shariah committee. Procedurally, the centralized Shariah 
committee must have the authority to conduct unannounced Shariah auditing visits. 
19 
 
- Shariah scholars posing on Shariah boards must be accredited by a special institution 
based on certain globally acceptable criteria, so that the Shariah board members 
who do not qualify for Ijtihad or fatawa must be taken out.  
  
Indeed, segregation between the Ijtihad institution and the political system has led to 
chaotic approaches to Ijtihad and fatawa by individual Shariah scholars. This disorder did 
not carry much harm before, but with the advance of Islamic banks it produced serious 
damages. The same disorder and confusion, however, will inevitably take place even in 
other fields of the Muslims’ affairs when they get the chance to be applied on institutional 
level, because the roots of the problem are the same; mainly the rupture between the 
political system and the Ijtihad institution. 
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